Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

John Carl Putvin v. Karen Larie Thompson, Joseph
Blaine Thompson : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mitchell R. Barker; Attorney for Appellee.
Daniel Darger; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Putvin v. Thompson, No. 930359 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5269

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH C O U S * OF APFEAP.3

DOCUMENT

KFU
50
DOCKET NO. — ? ^ £ ^ 7
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN CARL PUTVIN
Plaintiff and Appellee

vs.

Case No: 930359-CA

KAREN LARIE THOMPSON
JOSEPH BLAINE THOMPSON
Priority No: 4
Defendant and Appellant

REPLY

BRIEF

OF

APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Mitchell R. Barker
349 South 200 East #170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellee

Daniel Darger
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111
Telephone 801-531-6686

HLED
Attorney for Appellant* Court of Appeals
n MK

3 1 TO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF ISSUES"

1

REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" AND "COURSE OF
PROCEEDING

1

ARGUMENT

1

CONCLUSION

10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Pages

Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987)

6

Hume v. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d 309 [Utah 1979]

2

Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 [Utah Ct. App, 1990]

2

Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987)

6

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 512 (1989)

1

Rules
Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, Rule 33

10

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11

10

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59

2

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)

10

- ii -

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN CARL PUTVIN
Plaintiff and Appellee

vs.

Case No: 930359-CA

KAREN LARIE THOMPSON
JOSEPH BLAINE THOMPSON
Priority No: 4
Defendant and Appellant

REP 1

ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Mitchell R. Barker
349 South 200 East #170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellee

Daniel Darger
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111
Telephone 801-531-6686
Attorney for Appellant

REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF ISSUES"
As noted in the case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 512
(1989), it is the province of the Appellant to frame the issues on appeal, for "the party who
brings a suit [or appeal] is master to decide what law he will rely upon. . . . " Appellant's
"Statement of Issues" bears little resemblance to the issues raised by Appellant and appears
to be an attempt at cross-appeal. The statement should be ignored.
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" AND "COURSE OF
PROCEEDINGS"
Appellee is correct at Br. 1 in stating that this is an appeal from the denial of a
motion by Appellant seeking to set a custody decree aside. However, the remainder is little
more than argument, based upon misstatements of fact and fabrication, and should be
disregarded.
ARGUMENT
Appellee raises 25 points of argument in his response brief, many of them redundant.
Points 2., 3., 4., 10., 20., and 21. all involve Appellee's claim that this appeal was not
timely filed. These are the same issues that were raised and briefed in Appellee's Motion to
Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction and require no further reply except to point out that
Appellee continues to make arguments in his brief that were not warranted by law and were
frivolous when made in his motion to dismiss. However, he now has the benefit of
Appellant's reply to his motion, and if he didn't know the law then, he sure did when he
prepared his response brief.
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Point 9. also appears to be an attack on the timeliness of appeal not raised in
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss. Appellee seems to be arguing that Mr. Kimball's affidavit
and testimony is not newly discovered evidence and therefore the Rule 59 Motion to Alter or
Amend was not effective in tolling the time for appeal.
He cites no law for this proposition and totally ignores the case law readily available
in the annotations to this rule. All hold that a timely motion under Rule 59 U.R.C.P.
terminates the running of the time for appeal, and time does not begin to run again until the
order granting or denying such order is entered, (e.g. Hume v. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d
309 [Utah 1979]; Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 [Utah Ct. App, 1990])
Not a single Utah case holds that the time for appeal is tolled only if the trial court
finds that the Rule 59 motion is well taken, as Appellee suggests (Appellee Br. pp. 26, 27).
Such an interpretation would place counsel at risk of malpractice every time a Rule 59
motion was filed unless notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the original judgment
regardless of the outcome of the motion. This argument is frivolous.
At Point 6. (Appellee Br. p. 22), Appellee argues that Appellant is barred by the "law
of the case" from the relief sought herein. No cases are cited or evidence marshalled as to
how the law of the case applies. Instead, Appellee cites cases holding that a party must
show a "substantial change of material circumstances" before a decree can be modified.
Appellee ignores the fact that this is not an attempt to modify the decree and the cases cited
by Appellee are totally irrelevant.
Appellee argues at Point 7. (Appellee Br. p. 22) that Appellant had a chance to
protect herself (presumably from Mr. Kimball's conduct) during the trial of this case and that
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she failed to do so by failing to call Mr. Kimball as a witness. Further, he argues at Point
23 (Appellee Br. 43) that deference should be accorded the trial judge on this issue (of
awarding custody).
Ignored is the fact that the "trial" was actually an evidentiary hearing solely on the
issue of modifying visitation from supervised to unsupervised. Other issues were not before
the trial court and not relevant. Further, as pointed out below, the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are so insufficient that one is unable to determine why the trial court
awarded custody to Appellee. So how can this unknown determination be given deference?
This argument is without merit.
At Paragraph 8. (Appellee Br. p.25) the laches argument is made. Appellee argues
that Appellant's "delay" in pursuing an order setting the decree aside was unreasonable.
However, the record shows no delay. For upon retaining new counsel on May 4, 1992,
(Attachment A of Appellant's Brief), a motion to set the decree aside was prepared and filed
on May 26, 1992.(Rec. 658-704, 707-708) Further, as set out below, she did not learn that
a default decree had been entered until the end of January, 1992, at which time she was
again relying upon Mr. Kimball.
Appellee's claim that the delay between filing the motion to set aside and the courts
eventual ruling should be attributed to Appellant, is like the pot calling the kettle black..
(Appellee Br. p. 26) Appellant has no control over the trial court's schedule. She filed a
timely notice to submit her motion for decision on June 16, 1992 (Rec. 745) And on June
17, 1992, Appellee filed an objection to the notice to submit, arguing that the court had
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previously determined that Appellant's motion to modify the visitation provisions should be
resolved before the court acted upon the motion to set it aside. (Rec. 747-748)
And, several days later, Appellee got around to filing a response to the motion to set
aside (Rec. 749-759); followed by Appellant's motion to strike the objection and responsive
brief (Rec. 761-768); followed by Appellee's Amended Response to Motion to Set Aside
(Rec.814-824); followed by Appellant's motion to strike the amended response. (Rec. 825826) (The memo in support of this motion does not appear in the record for some reason and
is attached hereto as Attachment A)
A cursory examination of the above documents will reveal that it was Appellee who
was trying to delay the trial court's ruling on the motion to set aside, not Appellant. Further,
this examination will reveal a pattern followed by Appellee throughout this entire litigation of
ignoring the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and twisting facts to meet his purposes. (Not to
mention the impropriety of Attachment C of Appellee's Brief) And, Appellee is clearly
trying to mislead this court as well.
Points 1., 5., 15., 16., and 17. of Appellee's brief are all based upon a claim that
Appellant's answer was withdrawn and the default decree entered against her as a result of
her stipulation that it be done. Appellee's proof of a stipulation consists of Appellant's
infamous letter of November 4, 1991 (Rec. 410-413; Appendix A of Appellee's Brief) and
Mr. Kimball's signature approving the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree.
However, a review of the November 4th letter indicates absolutely no basis for the
misdeeds perpetrated upon Appellant on November 12th and 13th of 1991. And when
reviewed together with the affidavit of Mr. Kimball (Rec. 1380-1383) as well as the
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testimony of the parties set out below, it is clear that there was no meeting of the minds, no
knowing waiver of rights, and no authority for Mr. Kimball to do what he did. Finally, the
trial court's minute entry of November 12, 1991 (Rec. 414) indicates on its face that the
custody arrangement discussed in the telephonic scheduling conference was a temporary
arrangement indicating that it was "until such time the Defendant has resolved her problem."
(Rec. 414)
Attempts by Appellee, and the trial court, to justify what occurred the following day
on the basis of the November 4th letter is horribly misplaced. For this letter was intended as
a personal communication to Appellee, the father of Appellant's only child, not for the
benefit of the attorney's or the court! (Rec. 2175) Appellant's expressions of frustration and
resignation made in a personal letter to Appellee hardly rise to the level of a stipulation or a
settlement agreement. Instead, this letter reflects Appellant's repeated refusal to sign off on
Appellee's settlement demands and states "I am not giving up and neither is my family."
(Rec. 411) Yet, seven days later, Appellee managed to twist this personal letter into a
stipulation for withdrawing Appellant's answer and counterclaim, and entering a default
decree against her while Mr. Kimball stood lamely by. (Appellee Br. p.35: "This letter
constitutes a default") This is hardly justice.
Appellee argues at Points 11. and 12. that the Findings supporting the award of
custody were adequate because (1) custody was not at issue (Appellee Br. p. 28, 29) and, (2)
adequate findings were incorporated by reference in the form of the so-called custody
evaluation of Patricia Smith, Phd. (Appellee Br. p. 29-34) However, regardless of the
number of facts Appellee incorporated into the findings and conclusions by reference, they
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have a fatal flaw in that they never explain why the trial court felt one parent better than the
other. They simply fail to articulate a rational factual basis for the ultimate decision by
reference to pertinent factors that relate to the best interests of the child. Sanderson v.
Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987)
Appellee cites the case of Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987)
[Specific findings are not required where custody is not an issue.] in support of his
contention that the findings were adequate in the instant case. He argues that custody was
not an issue in the instant case because it had been resolved by the supposed "stipulation"
(the November 4th letter and Mr. Kimball's agreement to the findings)*
However, the Ebbert case is not applicable because custody was, and is, the only
issue, and hotly contested in the instant case. Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim
seeking custody (Rec. 299-302) And just prior to the entry of the default decree, she was
resisting attempts by Appellee and Mr. Kimball to get her to sign stipulations giving
Appellee custody. (Rec. 2169)

As Appellee's attorney, Mr. Barker stated:

...it's been broached the fact that there's been several attempts at stipulation, and
none of them included supervised visitation. Lest the court be misled into thinking
it's (supervised visitation) some kind of a punishment later, we need to establish
through these documents that she refused to even sign the very most basic two
paragraph stipulation. She wouldn't put her signature on anything. (Rec. 2066-2068)
And Appellee testified:
[Exhibit] thirteen is the settlement stipulation, a final settlement stipulation with my
signature on it, dated the 5th day of November, 1991, (8 days before the default
decree was entered) which was the product of five successive weeks of weekly
meetings between myself, yourself, Chase Kimball, attorney for Karen Thompson,
Karen Thompson, and Deborah's guardian ad litem, Arnold Gardner; and also
countersigned by the custody evaluator, Patricia Smith. (Emphasis added)
Q.

And the shorter one, the second one, which would be thirteen, I guess?
6

A.
Yes. It's a two paragraph stipulation, merely saying that John Putvin shall
receive sole permanent custody; Karen shall receive minimum standard visitation.
(Rec. 2067-2068)
* * *

Q.
(By Mr. Barker)
Mr. Putvin, those stipulations and the unwillingness to
sign them on Karen's part, why does that have anything to do with your concern that
there's a flight risk, and there should be supervised visitation?
A.
Well, first, in her deposition as has been entered in this record, she refused to
hypothetically agree to some stipulation that if one party moved, the other would get
custody. There was a great deal of ovation on that. Secondly, in this document it
stipulates that either party, a physical move by either party would be considered a
material change of circumstance, which would warrant a review of the custody
arrangement. And she refused to sign that.[No kidding!] (Emphasis and editorial
added)
* * #

Q.
With regard to those stipulations, what should make Judge Hanson believe if
anything that that concern is still real, there's still a concern that her refusal to sign
those stipulations, or other activities in relation to the court indicate there's still a
risk?
A.
She sent me, personally addressed to me, her November 4th letter, and in that
she says I'm not giving up the fight, but I'm not going to fight the devil, ie, you.
(Rec. 2069-2070) (Emphasis added)
Appellee has also testified as to the vehemence with which Appellant contested
custody, stating "...she's contested my name on the birth certificate, and Deborah's middle
name, and has opposed vehemently any effort on my part to have that corrected." (Rec.
2064)
Appellant's uncontroverted testimony is: "Because Chase [Kimball] was insisting that
I sign those other documents. As a matter of fact, he threatened me over the phone. And I
could not accept the way he was going on it." (Rec. 2175)

7

In response to Mr. Barker's question:
Now you have made some pretty serious accusations against Chase Kimball. Can you
tell us what threat he made to you to get you to sign? He threatened you to try to get
you to sign a stipulation, is that what you said?
she testified:
He was yelling at me in a very loud, and screaming voice over the phone, and he
says, you had better sign that. He says you better call me back within five minutes
with the answer to sign this, or you will loose your daughter, and you will be very,
very, very sorry. And he kept saying that over and over, and was very, very
threatening in his demeanor. (Rec. 2179)
Approximately one week later, Mr. Kimball made good his threat.
Thus, it is obvious that immediately prior to the supposed settlement which Appellee
claims made custody a non-issue, Appellant was adamantly refusing to settle or stipulate
away her claim to custody in spite of the threats of her own attorney! Thereafter, Appellee
used the November 4th letter and the complicity of Appellant's counsel to not only obtain
permanent custody, but an onerous visitation arrangement which effectively cut Appellant off
from any meaningful relationship with her daughter. (The quote of Judge Hanson at
Appellee Brf. p.23 is enlightening on how this was accomplished.)

And, shortly thereafter,

Appellee and the child moved to New Zealand.
The above testimony is also enlightening as to the argument made by Appellee at
Point 18. and 24. For, as Appellee admits at Brief 40-41, in January, 1992, when Mr.
Kimball attempted to act on Appellant's behalf in this action, Appellee filed a Motion to
Require Proof of Authority (Rec. 506-507) The obvious inference is that Appellee had
reason to believe Mr. Kimball had been discharged from the case.
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Mr. Kimball's affidavit in response to this motion (Rec. 499-500) does imply that his
representation of Appellant had been continuous and unbroken up to that date and to this
extent, is inconsistent with his later affidavit in support of the motion to amend. (Rec. 13801383) However, this later affidavit is clearly against Mr. Kimball's interest in that it exposes
him to civil suit for malpractice as well as professional disciplinary action.
More importantly it corroborates the inference that Appellee knew of his lack of
authority and provides a timeframe wherein Appellee obtained this knowledge (Before
Kimball approved the findings and decree). He had absolutely nothing to gain and
everything to lose in giving this affidavit and its credibility should be given great weight.
Appellee's argument, that Mr. Kimball did represent Appellant at the time the decree
was entered, misses the point. Whether he did or didn't, it is uncontroverted that he was not
authorized by his client to withdraw her answer and counterclaim, enter into a stipulation on
her behalf, approve findings of fact, conclusions of law or the entry of a default decree. In
fact, he was specifically directed otherwise by his client.
The uncontroverted testimony of Appellant is as follows:
Q.

When was the first time you saw that custody decree?

A.
If I've seen it, I think I have, if I've seen it, it was I went with you to the
courthouse.
Q.

When was the first time you ever became aware of the custody decree?

A.
I believe it was toward the end of January, and I don't even remember how I
found out, but I was very upset, and I called Chase, and raked him over the coals for
it.
Q.

Did you ever authorize Mr. Kimball to withdraw your answer?

A.

Did I ever authorize?
9

Q.

To withdraw your answer to this lawsuit, and let it go by default?

A.

No, I did not.

Q.
Did you ever authorize him to approve, or sign the Findings of Fact or that
default decree?
A.
Absolutely not. In the first place, I didn't know there was a default decree
going on. In the second place, he wanted me to sign one of these other things, and
when I refused, he said, well then let me sign it. I said, absolutely not. If anybody
signs it, it will be me, and you're not. (Rec.2170-2171)
In any event, it is manifestly unjust to sanction Appellant for Mr. Kimball's duplicity
and abandonment, or for bringing it to the trial court's attention.
CONCLUSION
It is obvious from the record that Appellant was unjustly denied a fair hearing on her
claim to custody of her child. Instead, the misdeeds of Appellee and Appellant's attorney,
Mr. Kimball, resulted in a default decree of custody which allowed Appellee and his other
wife, to whisk the child away to New Zealand. Since that time, Appellant has had to swim
up the stream of Appellee's numerous and meritless, motions, petitions, personal injury
actions and all else that a bottomless pocket and a willing attorney can devise to vex her.
This court should reverse the trial court's denial of Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion and
remand this matter for a hearing on the issue of custody. Further, Appellant should be
awarded attorney's fees for proceedings in the trial court and on appeal, pursuant to Rule 33,
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U.R.A.P. and Rule 11, U.R.C.P. for the numerous frivolous pleadings filed by Appellant
since May, 1992.

DATED this

2£& day of
DANIEL DARGER
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of
Appellant has been hand delivered to Mitchell R. Barker. 349 South 200 East, Suite 170,
Salt Lake City, UT 84111, this 3 0 day of . J M ^ M A . . 1994.
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ATTACHMENT A

Daniel Darger (0815)
Attorney at Law
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN CARL PUTVIN

:

Plaintiff,

:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO STRIKE

vs.
CivifNo: 910903188 CS
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL

:

Defendant

:

Judse: Hanson

COMES NOW, Plaintiff by and through her attorney Daniel Darger. Esq., and hereby
submits the above-entitled Memorandum.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

On May 26, 1992, Defendant served upon Plaintiffs counsel a motion and

memorandum to set aside the default custody decree entered in this matter. (Exhibit A)
2.

On June 2, 1992, Defendant served upon Plaintiffs counsel an addendum to

Defendant's memorandum in support of said motion. (Exhibit B)

3.

On June 16, Plaintiff had failed to file a responsive memorandum and on said

date, Plaintiff filed a notice to submit. (Exhibit C)
4.

On June 17, 1992, Plaintiff filed an objection to the notice to submit. (Exhibit

5.

On June 18, 1992, Plaintiff mailed to Defendant a response memorandum to

D)

Plaintiffs motion to set aside. (Exhibit E)
6.

This Court has entered no order extending Plaintiffs time to respond nor has it

entered an order staying the determination of Defendant's motion or otherwise delaying the
decision on Plaintiffs motion.
7.

On June 26, Defendant received Plaintiffs Amended Response (Exhibit F)
ARGUMENT

L

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM IS UNTIMELY

AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN
Rule 4-501 is clear in its requirement that a responsive pleading shall be filed and
served within ten days after service. The use of the mandatory word "shall" indicates that
strict compliance is required. Moore v. Schwendiman, ^50 P.2nd 204 (Utah App. 1988)
(Mandatory requirements must be complied with precisely)
The appellate courts of Utah have consistently held that the procedural time
requirements must be strictly complied with, unless a motion to extend the time is timely
made, or upon motion and a showing of excusable neglect, as provided by Rule 6(b) U.R.C.P.
The cites to these decisions are too numerous to include herewith considering the number of
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different rules to which they relate; e.g. Rule 12 (answer), rule 52 and 59 (motion for new
trial), appellate Rule 4, etc.
While the appellate courts in Utah have yet to rule on directly on this issue, the Court
of Appeals has indicated in dicta that a responsive memorandum must be timely for it to be
considered in ruling on a motion. In the case of Gillmore v. Cummings, 806 P.2nd 1205
(Utah App 1991), the court reversed an order of summary judgment because it was entered
prior to the expiration of the ten day period for filing a responsive memorandum. The court
stated: "...the trial court should have considered such a response, if timely received, before
ruling on the motion to strike and the summary judgment motion." (emphasis added, at page
1208)
Plaintiff was served with Defendant's motion on May 26, 1992 and the response
would have been due on June 8th, with the three day mailing period included. Defendant
served her addendum on Plaintiff on June 2, 1992 and Plaintiff waited an additional thirteen
days after this date to file the notice to submit. Thus, Plaintiff had at least twenty one days
in which to prepare a response, which he failed to do. Thus, the filing of an amended
responsive memorandum thereafter, is untimely and this court should strike this pleading as
not complying with Rule 4-501.
The alleged basis for Plaintiffs objection and the late filing of his memorandum and
amendment should be of substantial concern to this court. As the Court will recall, it noted
Defendant's motion to set aside while in chambers prior to the beginning of the evidentiary
hearing on Defendant's motion to modify visitation, he Court commented that a decision of
the motion to set aside may make the evidentiary hearing moot. However, Plaintiff states in
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his objection that this Court "stated that Defendant's earlier motion, to modify the visitation
provisions of the decree, should be determined before the instant motion is considered."
(Exhibit D) And in his memorandum, Plaintiff argues that his responsive memorandum is not
yet due because the courts comment referred to above somehow had the effect of staying
Defendant's motion to set aside, or tolling or extending the time within which Plaintiff is
required to answer. As this court is aware, Plaintiffs position has absolutely no basis in fact
or law.
To begin with, it defies logic and reason as to why this court would stay the decision
on a motion that may make a prior motion moot until the prior motion can be decided. If
anything, reason would dictate that it be the other way around. More importantly, this Court
entered no such order and no motion for such an order has been filed. Assuming the fact that
Plaintiffs counsel is a licensed member of the Bar, he is presumed to know that the alteration
of time requirements set by procedural rules can only be done upon stipulation or motion
properly brought before the court, and not by the courts spontaneous comment in chambers.
If he is not so aware. Rule 11 would require that he make inquiry. Instead of filing a Rule
6(b) motion, and providing a showing of excusable neglect, Plaintiff simply ignores the law
and files his memorandum.
Of equal concern is Plaintiffs outright misrepresentation of the facts. The comment
in chambers as recalled by this counsel was not as Plaintiff represents. However, Defendant
will leave it to the court to construe its own comments. Suffice it to say that this does not
amount to excusable neglect where, subsequent to the comment in chambers, Plaintiff was
served with

4

Defendant's addendum to the memorandum, clearly indicating that Defendant had no illusions
that her motion to set aside was not proceeding forward.
For the reasons above stated, Plaintiff respectfully request that this Court disregard
Plaintiffs amended memorandum in ruling upon Plaintiffs motion to set aside the default
decree. Further, this court should strike said pleadings from the record as untimely.

Dated th

day of

/1M
DANIEL DARGER
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Strike has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker, 2870
South State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692. this'lU dav of~3X)Q-*—
,
1992.
Jf

GlOmotpri
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EXHIBIT A

Daniel Darker (0815)
Attorney at Law

100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake'City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)533-6686

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN CARL PUTVIN
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SET ASIDI
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
'f-f*

vs.

Civil No: 910903188 CS
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL
Defendant

Judsre: Hanson

Motion is hereby made for an order setting aside the default custody decree entered in
the above matter by this Court on November 13, 1991. Tnis motion is made pursuant to Rule
60 (b) (5) in that said judgment is void to the extent that it provides relief different in kind
from or exceeding that specifically prayed for in plaintiffs complaint or to the extent that
said decree goes beyond the actual decision of this Court.

Further, this motion is made pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (7) in that said decree is

"improper, or illegal, and voidable." ( P & B Land. Inc v Klungen'fc. 751 P.2nd 274 [UL CL
App. 1988] at page 277)
Basis for this motion is more particularly set out in defendant's memorandum in
support hereof, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

Dated ±i^Z2h'

f
day of ~HTA/£
UA

r^v

. 1992.

Daniel Darger
Anorney at Law
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE"*
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 2 true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion has been
mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker.2870 South State Street, Salt Lake City, UT
84115-3692, ifais^lU day of _ £ C ^ i i 1992.

\5
GlmoLpri

For the reasons above suited, defendant respectfully requests that this Court set aside

the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Custody Decree previously entered.

Dated this

. day of

_. 1992.

DANIEL DARGER
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker.2870 South State Street, Salt Lake
City, UT 84115-3692, this P l y dav of T W \ . \ A
. 1992.

GlOmot.pri
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EXHIBIT B
1

I

•

Oaniel Darger (0815)
Auorncy at Law

]00 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City. Uiah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN CARL PUTVIN
ADDENDUM TO DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL
Civil No; 910903188 CS
Defendant
Judce: Hanson

COMES NOW, Defendant by and through her attorney Daniel Darger. Esq., and
hereby submits the above-entitled Memorandum.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Defendant realleges and incorporates herein the facts set forth in her

Memorandum in Suppon of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on file herein.

1

- -zr&h.

-*~ "la oibff words

A mere finding that the panics arc or arc not ' fit and proper persons to be
awarded the care, custody and control" of the child cannot pass muster when the
custody award is challenged and an abuse of the trial court's discretion is urged on
appeal. (Martinez v. Maninei. 728 P.2nd 994 [Utah 1986] at page 994.)
This exactly the instant case. The findings merely recite that Plaintiff is a fit and
proper person to be awarded custody. There is no finding as to what would be in the best
interest of Deborah.

And. in fact, this court could not malce the required findings based upon

the evidentiary record as it is. Tnere has been no evidentiary hearing to allow the court to
hear and weigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, nor is there a stipulation signed
by the panics as to what those facts are. Since the custody issue was not tried upon the facts,
there is simply no evidence for the court to sift in determining the best interests of Deborah
and, thus, the findings should be set aside as clearly erroneous.
For the additional reasons above stated. Defendant respectfully request that this Court
set aside the findings of fact, conclusions of law and custody decree heretofore entered.
Dated this , • 2**l
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ATinmtv for Plaintiff
Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker.2870 South State Street. Salt Lake
City. UT 84115-3692. this ' £~
cav of ~ " 3 U " - ^
. 1992.

•7 i_
G10mot.pri

A1

Ls<^~\

EXHIBIT C

u o r ^ A a s s u c o ' -TpnTouT ' S - B O T J J O e o E 5 d

" '

'il

20C 00C 0 0 6

'ON

Daniel Darker (0815)
Attorney for Defendant
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CARL PUTVLN
NOTICE TO SUBMIT
Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil No: 910903188 CS

KAREN LARIE THOMPSON
Judge: Timothy R. Hanson
Defendant

TO THE CLERK OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, pursuant to Rule 4-501(l)(d) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration, that all papers to be filed in support of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default
Judsment have been filed, and Defendant reauests that this be submitted for decision.
DATED this \L

day of

^ «>»../ .

1992.
DAKEL DARGER
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
u

K

XHE

!^BY

CERTIF

Y that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to Submit
1992.
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Exhibit D

Mitchell R. Barker, #4 53 0
Attorney for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3 692
Telephone (801) 486-9638
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
NOTICE TO SUBMIT

JOHN CARL PUTVIN,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 910903188CS
vs.
NAREN

LARIE THOMPSON, et al.,

Judge Hanson

Defendants.

Plaintiff

John

Carl

Putvin

("John"")

comes

now

and

respectfully objects to the "Notice to Submit" filed by defendant
Karen Thompson ("Karen") on or about June 16, 1992. The l^otice is
premature and contrary to the direction given by the Court.
Defendant herself has filed a Petition to Change Custody in
the action, which is still pending.

An evidentiary hearing was

held on that motion on Kay 27 and 28, 1992. The third day of the
hearing on her motion is scheduled for July 7, 1992.
At the two day hearing, the Court acknowledged defendant's
motion attacking the original decree, and szated that defendant's
earlier motion, to modify the visitation provisions of the decree,
1

should be determined before the instant motion is considered.
For some reason Plaintiff's counsel has no copy of defendant's
memorandum in its files. On this date the undersigned has obtained
a copy of the memorandum from the office of defense counsel.

In

the event the Court desires briefing of the matter now, the
plaintiff should be permitted an opportunity to brief this very
serious matter prior to submission for decision.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of June, 1992.

Mitchell R. Barker
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be
mailed to Daniel Dargerf Esq., on this 17th day of June, 1992, at
100 Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111.

A/

Kitchell R. Barker
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Mitchell R. Barker, ^'4 53 0
Attorney for Defendant
287 0 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3 692
Telephone (801) 486-9638
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

JOHN CARL PUTVIN,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 910903188CS
vs.
{AREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al.,

Judge Hanson

Defendants.

Plaintiff John Carl Putvin ("Putvin") comes now and responds
as follows to the "Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment" filed by
defendant Karen Thompson ("Thompson").

INTRODUCTION
Findings of Facr, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were entered
by the Court only after defense counsel agreed to them, and then
approved them by his signature.

Even if her ninety day period

within which to ask rhe Courr to consider setting aside the
judgment had

not already passed, her actions and those of her

attorney waived any defect she might have otherwise claimed.
1

b-!*-f}

Decree.

What she really seeks is a modification of the decree,

without following Pule 6-404, Utah Code of Jud. Admin., without
showing

changed

circumstances

and without

following

the

clear

procedural requirements and pre-conditions contained in the Decree.
Par.

5.

Since Thompson failed to appeal, she must move against

the

Decree

by

circumstances.

way

of

Anderson

a

petition

v.

Anderson,

to

modify,

showing

changed

12 Utah 2d. 36, 3 68 P. 2d 2 64

(1962) .
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of June, 1992.

Kitcneil R. .Barker
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on or about this eighteenth day of June,
1922, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Daniel Darger, Esq., 100
Commercial Club Building, 3 2 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111.

Mitchell R. Barker
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Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
Attorney for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone (801) 486-9638
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMENDED RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

JOHN CARL PUTVIN,
Plaintiffs,

Civil NO. 910903188CS
vs.
Judge Hanson

CAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al.,
Defendants.

Plaintiff John Carl Putvin ("Putvin") comes now and responds
as follows to the "Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment" filed by
defendant Karen Thompson ("Thompson").
INTRODUCTION
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were entered
by the Court only after defense counsel agreed to them, and then
approved them by his signature.

Even if her ninety day period

within which to ask the Court to consider setting aside the
judgment had

not already passed, her actions and those of her

attorney waived any defect she might have otherwise claimed.
This response memorandum is actually not yet due. During the
1

entered upon the minutes of the court."
Sec. 2 (1974)

73 Am.Jur2d

Stipulations

(footnote omitted, emphasis added); quoted with

approval in BarJcer v. Brown,

744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987).
CONCLUSION

Thompson has no basis for relief from her voluntarily entered
Decree. What she really seeks is a modification, without following
Rule 6-404, Utah Code of Jud. Admin., without showing changed
circumstances and without following the clear procedure and preconditions in the Decree. Par.

5.

Since Thompson failed to

appeal, she must move against the Decree by way of a petition to
modify, showing changed circumstances.
Utah 2d. 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962).

Anderson

v. Anderson, 12

Yet she argues as if on appeal.

Respectfully submitted this 18th day of June, 1992.

Mitchell R. Barker
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on or about this eighteenth day of June,
1992, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Daniel Darger, Esq., 100
Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111.

Mitchell R. Barker
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lie hail purchased the panties worn by E. In
tlie picture. Mrs. Workman corroborated,
(edifying tbut sho ilid not remember the
picture being taken and that sbc bad never
teen the picture or the panties before. Mr.
Workman testified that be could not remember the picture being taken. Even
though defendants knew that Kelly bad
behaved inappropriately with E , much of
the inappropiiate behavior that they knew
about occurred in I!»87 and 1088 and the
photograph was taken in 1986. Moreover,
any know ledge of inappropriate behavior
does not go to whether they knew the
photo was being taken, nor at what angle
and focus. Further, while Kelly did testify
to sexually abusing E., be never testified to
being sexually aroused by the photo in
question nor of taking or possessing it for
the purpose of being aroused, nor of telling
defendants that the photo aroused liim.
In abort, no evidence supports a conclusion that defendants knew that E.'s buttocks were only partially covered moments
before the photo was taken, that they
knowingly allowed Kelly to take or possess
the photo, or that they knew the photo was
taken or possessed by Kelly for the purpose of sexually arousing him. The State
therefore failed to present any evidence on
the intent element of the offense chare., d.
Thus, the judge was justified in arresting
the judgment on the basis that the facts
proved did not constitute an offense.

OIJSrilUCTION OF JUSTICE
| 5 | The State charged Mrs. Workman
with obstruction of justice in violation of
Utah Code Ann | 7G 8-306 4 The requi
site criminal intent is "with intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of a
crime
"
4.

Tlir liifofiuniiiiii t h . i f g l n f M i l W o i k i n a n t i l t h
vtol.ill.ui of Ui.ttt Lode A n n . f H * - J 0 6 charges
as follous:
lli.«l o n or a l w u l Scj»lcinl>cr. J90S to A i i | i i s l .
| 9 * 9 . at the place nliMctald j l a ) | u n | . llic defendants, as r a l l i e s , w i t h Inlcnl l u hinder,
pi event, or tfcM)' llic d t K o v c i y . appichrnsioii,
piosecution. convicllun or punishment of an-

Again, where either a trial or an appellate court, suhstitutea its judgment for thai
of the jury, the verdict must be bused on
evidence "so inherently Improbable that no
reasonable mind could believe it." State v.
Mycn. COG l\2il 260, 2fi3 (Utah I08U) (Wilkius, J. concurring) (citations omitted). Under such ciicuuistanccs, an arrest of judgment is appropriate.
'I he State claims that Mrs. Workman obstructed justice because she knew that Kelly was sexually abusing and exploiting E.
and she deliberately withheld this information from the police until after they contacted her. The specific evidence relied on
by the State is Mrs. Workman's knowledge
that Kelly sent bras to E in late 1087 or
early 1088, her receipt of the telephone call
about the pool incident in the summer of
1988, Kelly's statement that be wauled to
marry E. made lu 1087, and the pcijod of
daily long distance telephone calls for
which there is no date. The State further
claims that Mrs. Workman was motivated
to obstruct justice because she shared with
Kelly a joint account into which be deposited hundreds of dollars.
Mis. Workman testified, and Kelly corroborated that she handled each incident as
It came up. Each time, she reprimanded
Kelly, Informed him of the rules of her
household mid warned him not to do it
again. Kelly testified that he concealed his
abuse fiom the Workmans. In April 1088,
when the police informed Mrs. Woikuian
that Kelly was under investigation, she
readily provided the police with whatever
evidence and information they requested.
In fact, it was Mrs. Workman who, at the
request of the police, searched her daughters' bedrooms, found the lingerie and the
photographs and turned them over to the
police, lloth Kelly and Mrs. Workman testified that the funds in the account were to
pay for skating lessons for E., that Mrs.
Workman never knew bow much money

GILLMOH t. CIIMMINCS
was In the account, and that she made only
one withdrawal of eighty five dollars. Finally, these Incidents occurred over a two
and a half year period, during which time
Mrs. Workman was Involved with the myriad tasks of running a household of thii teen
to fourteen |>eople plus guests.
We agree with the trial court that Ihe
evidence is inherently Improbable such that
a reasonable mind could not conclude that
In 1D8G and 1987 Mrs. Workman was aware
that Kelly was sexually exploiting E. and
that thereafter she hclj>cd him conceal the
ciime until April 1988. Further, it Is Inherently Improbatle that, even if she were
aware of the abuse, the joint bank account
would have motivated Mrs. Workman to
conceal Kelly's abuse of her daughter. We
therefore find that the trial court was justified in arresting Judgment against Mra.
Workman because the facts proved did not
Bup|>ort the offense charged.
Affirmed.
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and conversion, Hie Third District Court,
Summit County. J. Dennis Frederick. J.,
granted summary Judgment for defendants, and appeal was taken. The Court of
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that trial
court Improperly granted luminary judgment prior to time In which plaintiff was
entitled to file response to defendants' motion to strike portions of bis affidavit opposing summary Judgment.
Reversed and remanded.

Judgment t^lfltf
Trial court improperly granted summary judgment prior to time In which nonrnovant was entitled to file response to movants' motion to strike portions of his affidavit opposing summary judgment. Judicial
Administration Rule 4 601( 1Kb).

I). Gilbert Alhay (argued), Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and appellant.

BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.

Bruce A. Maak, Michael M. l-aler (argued), Salt U k e City, for defendants and
respondents Garlick, I'clton A Valley Rank.
Ix)well V. Stimmerhays, Murray, for defendants and res|K>ndenls limberlake.
Dennis M. Astill, Salt U k e City, for defendant and respondent Valley Hank.

Charles F. GILLMOR, Jr., rialnlliT
and Appellant,
Vel|li CUMAIINCS, Jeffrey K. Garlick.
Janet K. Garlick. Peter Swmier. W. Allan I'cllon, Timber Lakes Corporation,
a Utnh corporation, Valley Rank and
Trust Company as trustee for the W.
Allan Triton Truat and for John Does 1
through 48, Defendant* and Appellees.
No. 890562-CA.

oilier for ihe c o m m l x l o n of • c r i m e d i d prol a t e ihe offender a m e a n t f o r a u d i t i n g disc o i d y or apprehension, obstruct by deception
an>one f i o m p c i f n m i i i i f a u a d thai inlglii
lead to discovery, apprehension, prosecution
or c o m i c l i o n of a pei«on. or conceal, alici or
destroy physical evidence.

Utah

Cll«»«*« r J j IJOi iiiimkApp. l»tl)

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 22, 1991.

Roundary dispute WM brought, alleging, inter alia, unlawful detainer, trespass

flefnre RENCII, HILLINGS and
GREENWOOD. JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellant Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. (Gill
mor) appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees Jeffrey K. and
Janet K. Garlick (Ihe Gsrlicks), and W.
Allan Pelton and Valley Rank and Trust
Company as trustee for the W. Allan IVl
ton Trust (Pelton). We conclude that the
summary judgment was granted prematurely because Gillmor was not given adequate time to res|>ond to appellees' motion
to strike portions of his affidavit opposing
summary ^ d g m e n t .
Therefore, we reterse.
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UACKOItOUM)
This dispute involve* neighboring parcels
of laitil in Summit County. Old ltatu.h
Itoad separates the land occupied by appellees (tinlit ks and IVHon, to the west, from
that occupied by (Jilhuor, to the east. In
October IUH7, Oillmor filed a complaint
alleging, in effect, that the record boundary of hit properly actually extends across
Old lUnrh Itoad. overlapping much of the
properly occupied by appellees. He sought
teli<f under theories of unlawful detainer,
trespass, and conversion, among others.
Appellees denied Oillmor's allegation, asset ling that under the property descriptions iu the relevant warranty deeds to all
thiec parcel's Old Itanch Hoad form* the
record boundary between their laud ami
(iilhuor'a. Appellees also asset ted that
even if Oillmor's allegation about the property overlap is correct, they had become
the owneis of the disputed land through
adverse possession
In November 10HR,
appellees moved for partial Biiinmnry judgment, on their adverse possession claim.
The summary judgment motion was accompanied by affidavits of the Oarh« ki and
JYItoii, as well as that of the Cat licks'
granlur, establishing the elements of adverse possesion; namely, continuous occupation of the land, with payment of all
Uxes thereon, for seven years. Utah Code
Ann. {{ 78 12 12 oud -12 I (1087). Copies
of propeitv la* receipts for the land occupied by appellees, going buck the requisite
seven years from October 1987, were attached lo the affidavit*. Certified copies
of Summit County tax plats were id so submitted. The plats identify the land occupied by appellees by the same identification
numbers shown on their tax receipts. The
plats also show Old Itanch Itoad as the
boundary between land taxed to appellees
and that taxed to (Jilhuor.
Hespouding to the summary judgment
motion, Oillmor alleged that hi 1086, he had
paid the taxes on the I'elton parcel before
1'elton. ami on the Carlitk parcel before the
Oarlicks' grantor, thereby interrupting the
necessary continuity of tax payments needed to establish adverse possession. See
J'UISOHS v. Andeison, (5i>0 l'.2d 635, 638

(Utah 1081) Oillmor submitted a copy of
his lORfi property tax receipt, confirming
the timing of his 1086 tax payment. However, Oillmor's tax receipt is not for taxes
paid under appellees' tax identification
numbers. Instead, it hears the identification number assigned to Oillmor on the tax
plats, indicating that he is taxed only on
land east of Old Itanch Itoad.
Oillmor also contested the continuous occupation element of the Oarlicks' claim.
He did this by stating iu his affidavit that
he had been unaware, prior lo 1080, of
fence rebuilding that the Oarlicks' grantor
had completed in November l!»80. According to the affidavit of the Oarlicks' grantor, no buildings appeared on the Cat lick
pioperly until a ham was completed hi
November 1080; a home was completed
and ocrnpied iu December 1081. Tellou, la
his affidavit, stated that he had built a
home mi (he land he occupies in 1076. ('.ill
tour did not contest the continuous occupation element of Felton's adverse possession
claim.
The Oarlicks and Tcllon then filed a reply memorandum and a motion to strike
five paragraphs of Oillmor's affidavit o|tposiug summary judgment. Appellees argued lhat those paragraphs were nol based
on Oillmor's personal knowledge, and did
not contain admissible evidence, as re
quired by Itule f>G(e), Utah Itules of Civil
Pioceduie. The patagraphs included Oill
mor'a claim that he had paid taxes on the
Car lick and lYllon property, and his claim
(hat he had been unaware of fencing
changes on the Carlick propeiIy befotc
1080.
Appellees' reply memorandum and.
motion to strike were filed on Januaiy 12,
1080
On January 10, 1080. by minute
entry, the trial court granted the motion to
sti ike and granted summary judgment hi
appellees' favor. There was no hearing on
either the motion for summary judgment or
the motion to strike.
On January 25. 1080, Oillmor filed a "motion to reconsider" the summary judgment
The primary ground for the motion was
Oillmor's assertion that "there Is a genuine
issue of fact as to where the Cat lick and
Teltuu homes are located." However, dill

OII.I.AIOit r. etlMMINCS
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riu.»Ao* r i.t nol ituo, A|.,*. tMti
mor also noted that the court had not given alder hi a second minute entry, dated Febhim ten da>s to respond to Hppellees' mo- runiy 7, 1089 and mailed to the parlies on
tion (o strike, as provided by Utah Code February 9, 1080. The minute entry reJud Admin. 4-50|(I)(b). Oillmor filed a sec- flects that the court considered Ihe memoond affidavit with his motion lo reconsider, randa submitted in connection with the momodifying the stricken paragraphs of his lion lo reconsider, but does not reveal
fits! affidavit to claim personal knowledge whether the affidavits submitted by (iillof the facts alleged therein. In this affida- mor with the motion lo reconsider were
vit, Oillmor also alleged, for Ihe first time, considered for their possible impact on the
that Old Itanch Itoad, identified in his origi- summary judgment.
nal warranty deed as the boundary beOn February 10, Oillmor's re.*|»onse lo
tween his propeily and lhat of appellees,
appellees' reply memorandum was filed
hail been moved "at least twice" since the
with the trial court. This response memoexecution of that deed, most recently hi
randum was timely under Utah Code Jud.
1078. Oillmor also filed an affidavit of hi«
Admin. 4-f>01(!)). The memorandum was
surveyor, James West. West slated that
accompanied by a second affidavit by surhe had surveyed (iilhuor'a land in August
1087, and had determined that Oillmor's veyor James West, claiming that, tinder Ihe
propei ty over lapped viilh lhat occupied by "metes and bounds description" of Oillappellees. A map of the Oillmor properly, mor's oiigiual warranty deed, West still
drawn from West's survey, was attached to cnmhid.d that Oillmor'a property overlapped nith that of appellees. Oillmor's
West's affidavit.
response memorandum and the second
The Oarlicks and Pelton responded lo West affidavit fell on deaf ears, however,
Oillmor's motion to rrmnsidir on February
the court having already denied the motion
7, 1080. In their response memorandum, to reconsider. F inal judgment on the sumappellees contested Oillmor's and West's maty judgment order Has entered on
asset (ions that Oillmor's property extended
March 22, 1080, and this appeal followed.
across Old Itanch Itoad. arguing that
West's survey imprnpctly relied on a metes
and bod'tids description of Oillmor's properOillmor raises two issues on appeal.
ty, instead of the warranty deed description
First, he contends that there is a genuine
In Oillmor's chain of title, describing the
dispute as to the true location of the hound
roail as the boundary.
aty between Oillmor's propei ty and lhat of
Under Utah Code Jud.Admin. 4-f>01(l)(c). appellees. 1 His second contention is lhat
(iillmor had five days, as the moving party,
there is a material dispute as to whether
to file a reply to appellees' memoiandtim. appellees satisfied the tax payment element
'Ihe trial court did not wait five da\s, howfor adverse |tossession of the property they
ever, but denied Oillmor's motion to rccott- now occupy.1

issues

I.

nillnior coucclly claims lh.il there I* • «llv
puled Issue of fact concerning the location of
llic ICCOMI boundaiy between his piopeily and
lhat of appellees, at Is icfleclcd In his alllJavit
and those of the surveyor. Ihis Issue, however.
Is not maicilal vtlili tespccl to the question of
windier appellees have satisfied the icquliemenls for ad\ cise possession, whiih u a s the
sole fiooml lor their summary Judgment motion. Indeed, the summary Judgment motion
stalls with the assumption that the K.nlnV* nod
I'clloii do In fjet occupy pio|»oty to vvhkh
Gllliuoi holds reroid title. The line location of
the tccord boundaiy has no beating on the
•dvctse possession claim. However, hi ihe
event ap|K.decs' adverse possesion defense
fads, ihcy must addicss (lilhuui'i boundaiy line
claim.

I.

Utah Code Ann g 75 I? I? (1957) rrqolres
rtmiiuuoos occupation and payment ol ta«c» on
laud adversely claimed.
In no rase shall advene po*»e*«lon t*- consldcicd cMahtisWd ondn the pHuislons of
any Ktllon of this code, imhss It sltall he
shown that the land had Wen occupied and
claimed lor I he ftcilnd of set en veais coolmu
ously. and thai the paily, hi* piedercv«ois and
ft anion have paid all laves v h i i h have hern
levied and assessed upon stub land accoiding
to law.
fJilbnui's memoranda and affidavit* apparently
diqmlc both the seven year coniimioui rxtnpalion and lax pa) incut foi the Oat licks aud / or
I'elton.
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We reverse because of procedural error, response, If timely received, before ruling
and not on cillirr issue liiltmor urines on ' on the motion lo strike nnd the summary
appeal * 'therefore, we do nut address Ihc judgment motion. Il was error, however,
to rule on the motions on January ID, six
substantive issues (iillmor presents.
days hefore (lillmor's time to respond lo
the motion to strike had expired.
ANALYSIS
I'focedural

Ertor

Appellees' motion to strike parts of (Jillluoi's firM affidavit wax based on Utah
It Ov P .r)ll(r) That rule provides that ill tt
Miiinnary judgment motion, "|s)upport'ing
And opposing affidavits shall he made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth surh
farts as would he admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affignt is competent to testify hi (he matters
Mated therein." 'Iho motion to strike was
filed simultaneously with, hut separately
from, appellees' reply memorandum siqvportiug their under ly iug summary judgment motion.
Ilecause appellees' Rule f>fi(c) objection lo
Cilhuor's fust affidavit was framed as it
separate, written motion to Mi ike, (Jillmor
should have heeu given ten days to re«o<iod, as prescribed hy Utah Code .lud Ad
mill 4 GOl(!)(!•) Additionally, herause the
motion was served on (•'illmor hy mail,
Utah It Civ P. 6(c) entitled him to an mhli
tiunal Ihree da)s Therefore, herause the
motion to strike was served on January 12,
1!»H!>, Cilhunr should have heeu given until
January 2f> to respond.

Gilhnor's motion to reconsider, anil (he
Affidavits filed with that motion, were filed
on January 2f», 1980. Under the combined
operation of Utah Code Jud Admin. 4COIdX") and Utah II Civ P. 6(e), these materials would have heeu timely if they had
hecn suhmitted ns it response to appellees'
motion lo strike. (lillmor's motion lo reconsider also directed the trial court's silent ion to the prematurity of (he summary
judgment tinder Utile I M>)(»)0') At that
point, the trial court should have corrected
the procedural prohlem with its summary
judgment ruling hy reconsidering that ruling in light of (lillmor'a Jaiionry 25 affidavits However, (he record does not reveal
whether the trial court denied Ihc motion to
reconsider upon study of Gillmor's January
2f> affid-uits or, in denying the motion lo
reconsider, disregarded those affidavits alUv» ether.

Ilecause the tiial court granted summary
judgment prematurely underftlie applicable
procedural rules, itml because nothing in
the record indicates that the court corrected its procedural error when that error was
called to its attention, the summary judgment is set aside. See (hoco fishing &
(Iillmor could have responded lo the mo- Mental Tools, Inc. v. Iiomrontl Exploration lo strike hy supplementing his affida- tion. Inc., i:i6 P 2d 62, 62 61 (Utah tiHH);
vit to meet Itnlc !ifi(e) standards. Utah A'ft v lh niton. 718 P 2d f»H8, 6!>l (Utah
It Civ.P. 66(e) (court may permit parly In Ct.App 11)88). We reverse nnd remand to
summary judgment motion to supplement the trial court for proceedings consistent
j» I fid.iv ili with depositions, answers lo in- with this opinion, r'ach party shall pay his
ter rogatories, or further affidavits). He- or its own costs.
cause summary judgment is appropriate
HENCII nnd HILLINGS, JJ., concur.
only when it is clear that no disputed issues
of material fact exist, we believe that (Jill
mor should have been allowed to respond
to the motion in this fashion, and that the
trial court should have coubidcred such a
J.

Although flilhnoi dij rtol Include piocedoial
ei• or as a ha sis («ir »j<pral in his hiicf, he did
aigoc the Issue ht-foie ihc liUl com I. We outsidrr ihc procedural Issue on ap|tca| for |«ioftiial reasons: we I K nuahlc lo dclrimhie horn
the record hcfoic us uhal the court artoallv
considered In gianting the summaiy judgment
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and driving ihc motion for reconsMei allon.
lliis is stnnt.ii lo rhosc cases vshrrc we remand
for findings became wc are iniahlc to discern
h u m ihc record how the court irsohrJ malcrUl
Issues. Sec At ton e. Dcliian. HI V 2J 996, 999
(Utah 1957); Stale r. hn-fgig*. M V 2d W. •
J
770-71 (Uuli C| A|.p 1990).

IIOUTIJ, t. IIOU'LI I.
Ulah | 2 0 9
c>i#*«»o« r.*A uv> {uuKAri*. r»»0
as dale of separation, if one parly has
Waller James IIOWPL!.. Plaintiff
acted obstructively.
nnd Appellee,
3. Divorce 4-217
t.
Determining standard of living in or*
Dnrhnra Joyce IIOWLLL. Defendant
tier In net alimony after divorce i« fael sen*
,
and Appellant.
pitive, suhjectift* tusk ami is not determined
by actuul expenses alone.
No. 89059&-CA.
4. Divorce *--»M5
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Trial courts have discretion In deterFeb. 28, 1991.
mine standard of living which existed duri.
ing marring? after consideration of releI
vant facts and equitable p» imiples.
ILSaijji
Divorce was sought. The Third Dis&'!|j! Irict Court, Salt Lake County, Frank <i. 5. Divorce «S^2.17
Trial courts must consider the followHJl i«, ^ 0 L '' ^•• K™"(ed tlivorce, awarded alimony,
ItJ'ltV and divided properly. Former wife appeal- ing factors in setting alimony after divorce:
jijS, cd. The Court of Appeals, (ireenwood, J., financial conditions and needs of recipient
'VjJ i 'held thai: (I) tiial court erroneously looked rpouse, recipient's ability to produce in'«'}: lo preseparatiorr standard of living in set* come, and ability of payor spouse lo pro
if'' ling alimony nnd should have considered vide support.
jljjCij; standard of living dining marriage up to
6. Divorce *=2I0(2)
'«mF'|j i lime of trial approximately two years after
Trial court selling alimony after diniil^ •eparation; (2) monthly alimony awaid was
vorce should first determine financial needs
ba S."* inadequate to equalise parties' standard of
and resources of both parlies and should
^ • ^ } living at time of divorce; ami (.'I) (rial court
set alimony as permitted b> those paramecW
uw
U^
M ««Cua« to »|H«vttUU »\«ou\ hypo\hettilfoi*
flif
ters to approximate parties' standartl of
future las couseiprerices of propeily
living during martiage as closely »<t pnssi
ision pursuant to tlivorce.
hie.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
7. Divorce «-»2lum
I1;rj- remanded.
If payor spouse's resources are adepart,
dissented
iljjil
Hcurli, J , concurred In
quate, alimony following divorce need not
be limited to provide for only hitMc needs,
T't^i
but thnuld AIM* consider recipient spouse's
station hi life.
Dlvoice <-»237
awi i.
Alimony was erroneously based on pr*« 8. Divorce 4^2.19
separation standartl of living and should
Trial court setting alimony after di
£J have been based on standard of living tlurvorce must make findings on all material
\. lug the marriage up lo lime of divorce trial
issues.
•H-", shout two years after separation; during
'iiijfj; that two year period, husband's income 9. Divorce «=>2.19, 28fi(9)
jj'* doubled because another airline purchased
Trial court's failure lo make findings
husband'* employer, and husband's ability on all issues material to setting alimony
lo tako advantage of thai change in part after divorce constitutes revrrsihle error.
yresulted from perseverance during lean unless pertinent facts in record are clear,
tii
uueontroverted, and capable of 6iippoiting
.11
only finding in favor of judgment.
j t 2. Divorce *-253<3)
jj 1
Value of marital property is deter- 10. Divorce «=>2I0(I)
Monthly alimony award of $1,800 was
mined as of lime of divorce decree or at
]'trial, but courts can, in exercise of (heir inadequate (o equalize abilities of former
equitable powers, use different date, such wife and former husband lo go forward
it».

